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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants, Arnold Holmes and Lawrence Hollyfield,filed 
a civil action against Appellees pursuant to SS 404 and 
502(a) of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* The Honorable John R. Gibson, United States Circuit Judge for the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation. 
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29 U.S.C. SS 1104 & 1132(a). The District Court had 
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
S 1132(e)(1). We have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court's final order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
Appellants, plaintiffs below, successfully prosecuted their 
claim to interest on pension benefits they received after a 
decade and a half of delay. Nevertheless, Appellants 
challenge two equitable limitations the District Court placed 
on the interest it awarded. They also challenge the District 
Court's refusal to certify two classes of plaintiffs they 
proposed for class action purposes. Finally, they challenge 
the District Court's ruling that a legal memorandum they 
sought to discover was protected by the doctrine of work- 
product immunity. We will affirm in part, and reverse in 
part. 
 
Appellees, defendants below, cross appeal, ostensibly 
raising an issue as to whether the District Court erred by 
concluding that Appellants were entitled to any interest at 
all, regardless of the limitations it imposed. Rather than 
directly challenging the District Court's decision, however, 
they limit their argument to a critique of our decision, 
which the District Court correctly found controlling, in 
Fotta v. Trustees of the United Mine Workers of Am. Health 
& Retirement Fund, 165 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding 
that ERISA permits actions to recover interest on wrongly 
withheld benefits even where the benefits were paid before 
litigation). We hold that the argument is not properly 
presented in this appeal, and decline to entertain it. 
 
I. Background Facts & Procedure 
 
Appellants, as well as the members of the plaintiff classes 
they seek to certify, are participants in, or beneficiaries of, 
the Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corporation and its 
Subsidiary Companies (hereafter referred to as "the Plan"). 
Prior to a 1977 amendment, the Plan required that benefits 
due under the Plan be offset (i.e., reduced) by the amount 
of any pension benefits the relevant participant received 
from any source other than the Plan itself. In July 1977, 
the Plan was amended so that the offset requirement 
applied only to non-plan pension benefits "attributable to 
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employment with an Employing Company." See  Bethlehem 
1977 Salaried Pension Plan S 3.8 (J.A. at 128-29). In other 
words, after the 1977 amendment, non-Plan pension 
benefits received from sources falling outside the definition 
of an Employing Company are not deducted from benefits 
received from the Plan itself. 
 
The Plan defines an "Employing Company" to mean 
Bethlehem Steel, any Bethlehem Subsidiary that has 
adopted the Plan, and "any corporation which, prior to July 
31, 1966, was merged into or consolidated with any such 
subsidiary company or with" Bethlehem Steel. See 
Bethlehem Steel 1977 Salaried Pension Plan at 2 (J.A. at 
120). Additionally, the Plan provides that benefits received 
from sources falling within the definition of an Employing 
Company are offset only to the extent they were earned 
during a period in which the participant was being 
"credited with continuous service for the purpose of 
calculating the amount of any regular pension under[the] 
Plan." Id. at 19-20 (J.A. at 128-29). 
 
Appellants Holmes and Hollyfield both worked for 
Bethlehem Steel subsidiaries prior to their respective 
retirements, and both participated in the Plan. After retiring 
in 1977, Hollyfield applied for pension benefits from both 
the Plan, and from the United Mine Workers of America 
Retirement Fund. Unlike the Plan, the UMWA Fund is not 
employer specific. Rather, it is a multi-employer plan 
providing benefits to all workers represented by the UMWA. 
Like the Plan, however, it is funded entirely by employer 
contributions, including contributions from Bethlehem 
Steel and its subsidiaries. 
 
Following his retirement, the Plan awarded Hollyfield 
$214.13 in monthly pension benefits, effective December 1, 
1977. Nearly a year later, in November 1978, his 
application for UMWA benefits was granted in the amount 
of $250 per month, retroactive to September 1, 1977. 
Thereafter, the Plan notified Hollyfield that his Plan benefits 
would be reduced by the full amount of his UMWA benefits. 
Thus, because his UMWA benefits were greater than this 
Plan benefits, Hollyfield's Plan benefits were eliminated 
altogether. Additionally, because his UMWA benefits award 
was retroactive, the Plan also required Hollyfield to repay 
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all Plan benefits he had previously received. Hollyfield 
complied, paying the Plan $2,449.56 in previously received 
benefits. The Plan did not request, and Hollyfield did not 
pay, interest on the repaid benefits. 
 
Appellant Holmes retired in 1980 and, like Hollyfield, 
applied for pension benefits from both the Plan and from 
the UMWA Fund. The Plan awarded him a monthly benefit 
of $1,224.36, effective February 1, 1981. In October 1981, 
the UMWA Fund awarded Holmes a monthly benefit of 
$290.00, retroactive to November 1980. As it did with 
Hollyfield, the Plan determined that all of Holmes' UMWA 
benefits should be offset against his Plan benefits. And, 
again, it required Holmes to repay all offset amounts 
already received. Thereafter, Holmes repaid the Plan 
$2,825.00, reflecting principal only and no interest. 
 
In 1994, Hollyfield's son contacted Plan administrators 
regarding his father's Plan benefits. In a subsequent 
investigation, the Plan determined that none of Hollyfield's 
UMWA benefits were earned during a period in which he 
was being credited with continuous service for purposes of 
calculating his Plan benefits. In other words, the Plan 
concluded that none of Hollyfield's UMWA pension should 
have been offset against his Plan benefits during the 17- 
year period since he had retired. Consequently, the Plan 
paid Hollyfield a lump sum of $47,553 in past-due benefits. 
That sum represented past-due principal only, and did not 
include any interest payments for the period of delay. 
 
A similar series of events in 1997 led to Holmes' 
collection of $24,514 in past-due Plan benefits. In contrast 
to Hollyfield's case, however, the Plan determined that 
Holmes earned 65% of his UMWA benefits at the same time 
he was being credited with continuous service for purposes 
of calculating his benefits under the Plan. Therefore, his 
lump-sum payment amounted to only 35% of the Plan 
benefits that had been offset in the sixteen years since his 
retirement, not the 100% that Hollyfield had recovered. 
 
Shortly after Holmes received his past-due benefits, his 
attorney placed a call to the Plan's offices. In a conversation 
with an assistant to the Plan's administrator, the attorney 
claimed that Holmes was entitled to interest on his past- 
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due benefits as well as the principal. In response, a Plan 
attorney prepared a memorandum analyzing the legal 
issues surrounding Holmes' interest claim. The 
memorandum was circulated to other Plan attorneys, as 
well as to its administrator. Thereafter, the administrator 
informed Holmes' attorney that nothing in the Plan 
provided for interest payments on delayed benefits, and 
that the administrator had determined such a payment 
would not be appropriate. See Letter from Dopera to 
Thornton of 07/22/1997 (J.A. at 185). Holmes then 
appealed the denial of his interest claim to the Plan's 
Employee Benefits Administration Committee. The 
Committee affirmed. See Letter from Dopera to Thornton of 
10/10/1997 (J.A. at 191). 
 
In March 1998, Holmes and Hollyfield filed a civil 
complaint against the Plan and its administrators. In Count 
One of the complaint, both Holmes and Hollyfield sought 
interest on their delayed benefits, as well as disgorgement 
of any additional profits the Plan may have earned on those 
benefits during the period of delay. Holmes also challenged 
the continuing 65% offset of his UMWA benefits against his 
Plan benefits, arguing that the UMWA benefits were not 
received from an "Employing Company." See  App. at 20. 
Count Two alleged violations of the fiduciary duty to 
disclose accurate information. See id. at 21. 
 
The complaint also sought certification of two proposed 
classes of Plan participants and beneficiaries: (1) those 
whose benefits had been, were or would one day be 
erroneously offset; and (2) those who had received or one 
day would receive past-due benefits but neither interest nor 
disgorgement of unjust gains. On August 12, 1998, the 
District Court denied the motion for class certification 
without prejudice, granting Appellants leave to refile their 
motion after additional discovery. 
 
During the course of discovery, Appellants sought to 
compel production of the legal memorandum prepared in 
response to Plaintiff Holmes' initial claim to interest on his 
delayed benefits. The defendants argued that the 
memorandum was protected by both the attorney-client 
privilege and the doctrine of work-product immunity. A 
Magistrate Judge rejected the attorney-client privilege 
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claim, but concluded that the memorandum was protected 
from discovery under the work-product immunity doctrine. 
The District Court affirmed, concluding that the Magistrate 
Judge's reasoning was neither clearly erroneous nor 
contrary to law. 
 
After answering Appellants' complaint, the defendants 
moved for summary judgment on both of its counts. With 
respect to Count One, the defendants argued that neither 
ERISA nor the Plan required payment of interest"when 
retroactively awarding benefits to a participant." See Def.'s 
Motion for S.J. at 4 (J.A. at 49). The District Court agreed, 
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on Count One's interest claims. 
 
The court also ruled that Plaintiff Holmes had failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his 
continuing-offset claim. Consequently, the court dismissed 
the claim without prejudice. Holmes subsequently 
reasserted the claim in a separate law suit. See Holmes v. 
Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel and Subsidiary Cos. , No. 
99-CV-2369 (E.D. Pa., filed May 7, 1999) (J.A. at 591). The 
District Court also granted summary judgment for the 
Defendants on Count Two's breach-of-fiduciary-duty 
claims, ruling that they were barred by the statute of 
limitations. Thereafter, the court entered final judgment 
and closed the case. 
 
On February 4, 1999, the District Court granted 
Appellants' motion for reconsideration of their interest 
claims based on our intervening decision in Fotta v. 
Trustees of the United Mine Workers of Am. Health & 
Retirement Fund, 165 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that 
ERISA permits actions to recover interest on wrongly 
withheld benefits even where the benefits were paid before 
litigation). At the same time, the court also ruled that the 
doctrine of laches would limit the period for which interest 
could be recovered, and that Pennsylvania's general six- 
year statute of limitations provided the appropriate 
limitations period. See Mem. & Order of 02/04/1999 at 5- 
7 (J.A. at 528-30). 
 
In a subsequent Memorandum and Order, the District 
Court ruled that Appellants were entitled to interest on 
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their delayed benefits. But, based on a balancing of the 
equities, the court also ruled that such interest should be 
calculated at the post-judgment interest rate specified in 28 
U.S.C. S 1961. See Mem. & Order of 03/25/1999 at 3-9 
(J.A. at 528-30). Thus, the court ordered the Plan to pay 
Appellants Holmes and Hollyfield $1391.50 and $459.68 
respectively as interest on their delayed benefits. On March 
25, 1999, the court closed the case for a second time. 
 
A few days earlier, Appellants had renewed their motion 
for class certification, once more proposing two classes of 
prospective plaintiffs. Consequently, on April 7, Appellants 
moved the District Court to reconsider its order closing the 
case, and to consider their renewed motion for class 
certification. The District Court granted the motion to 
reconsider, but ultimately denied certification of both 
proposed classes. That denial was based on the court's 
conclusion that the proposed class definitions were overly 
broad, and that neither class satisfied the prerequisites for 
certification. See Mem. & Order of 06/30/99 at 7-29 (J.A. 
at 607-29). The court then closed the case for a third time, 
and Appellants filed this appeal. 
 
On appeal, Appellants argue that the District Court erred 
by: (1) awarding interest at the statutory rate rather than 
requiring the Plan to disgorge the actual profits it earned on 
their delayed benefits; (2) concluding that the doctrine of 
laches applied to limit the period for which they could 
recover interest; (3) denying certification of their proposed 
plaintiff classes; and (4) concluding that the legal 
memorandum they sought to discover was entitled to work- 
product immunity. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. Appellant's Interest Rate Claims 
 
Though ultimately awarded interest on their delayed 
pension benefits, Appellants argue that the District Court 
erred by calculating the award based on the post-judgment 
interest rate established at 28 U.S.C. S 1961. Relying on 
our decision in Fotta, Appellants argue that they are 
entitled to recover interest at the actual rate of return that 
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the Pension Plan earned during the period it wrongfully 
delayed payment of their benefits. Our review of the District 
Court's interpretation and application of Fotta  is plenary. 
See Holmes v. Millcreek Township Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583, 
589 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Louis W. Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 
1994)). We conclude, however, that it is Appellants, not the 
District Court, who have misinterpreted Fotta . 
 
In Fotta, we held that a beneficiary may bring an action 
under ERISA against a pension plan "to recover interest on 
benefits the plan paid after some delay, but without the 
beneficiary having sued under ERISA" to recover the 
benefits themselves. See id. at 210. In earlier decisions, we 
had already recognized that prejudgment interest was 
available where the beneficiary had brought suit under 
ERISA to recover unpaid benefits. See Fotta , 165 F.3d at 
212 (citing Schake v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp. Severance 
Plan for Salaried Employees, 960 F.2d 1187, 1192 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 1992); Anthuis v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 
999, 1010 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
 
Those earlier decisions were based on recognition of the 
fact that 
 
       "[t]o allow the Fund to retain the interest it earned on 
       funds wrongfully withheld would be to approve of 
       unjust enrichment. Further the relief granted would 
       fall short of making [the claimant] whole because he 
       has been denied the use of the money which was his." 
 
Id. (quoting Short v. Central States, Southeast and 
Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 729 F.2d 567, 576 (8th Cir. 
1984)). Those principles applied, we held in Fotta, whether 
the beneficiary ultimately recovered the wrongfully withheld 
benefits through judicial action, or through non-judicial 
means. See id. 
 
Although Fotta makes clear that interest on delayed 
ERISA benefits is an equitable remedy left to the discretion 
of the trial court, id. at 213-15, we also held that "interest 
is presumptively appropriate." Id. at 214. We did not, 
however, offer extensive guidance for deciding what rate of 
interest is appropriate in a given case. Recognizing the need 
to fill this gap, as well as its discretion in doing so, the 
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District Court in this case turned to Fotta's two primary 
justifications for interest awards: (1) ensuring full 
compensation to the plaintiff; and (2) preventing unjust 
enrichment. See Mem. of 03/25/1999 at 5, (J.A. at 571) 
(citing Fotta, 165 F.3d at 213). In considering these two 
justifications, the District Court concluded that Fotta did 
not qualify one as more important than the other, and that 
each could result in a different interest rate. See id. 
 
Focusing solely on compensating the plaintiff, the court 
concluded that it would be inappropriate to award interest 
at a rate higher than the essentially zero-risk yield on 
Treasury Bills provided for in 28 U.S.C. S 1961. See id. at 
6. In the court's view, it would be "highly speculative" to 
simply assume that Appellants would have invested their 
benefits in higher-risk, higher-yield securities, and that to 
so assume would be to reward them for risks they did not 
take. See id. On the other hand, if the only objective were 
to prevent unjust enrichment, disgorgement of the 
defendant's actual profits would be the appropriate 
measure of interest to be awarded. See id. Ultimately, the 
District Court concluded that the best way to resolve this 
apparent conflict was to resort to equitable principles. See 
id. at 7. 
 
Balancing the equities, the District Court concluded that 
requiring the Plan to disgorge its profits "would be 
essentially punitive in nature," and that punitive measures 
were inappropriate where the delayed payment of benefits 
was inadvertent rather than intentional. See id.  The court 
further concluded that "the fact that the Appellants have 
been paid amounts on all of the years, rather [than] the 
amount they are legally entitled to is further evidence of 
good faith." Id. at 7-8.2 Therefore, the court ruled, 
restitution was the most equitable measure of interest due, 
and restitution would be achieved by awarding interest at 
the Treasury Bill yield rate as calculated according to the 
analogous provisions in 28 U.S.C. S 1961. Performing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The court had previously concluded that had Appellants been forced 
to sue for recovery of their past-due benefits, the statute of limitations 
would have barred them from recovering benefits due more than six 
years prior to the filing of their suit. 
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necessary calculations, the District Court then awarded 
Appellants interest at the rate of 5.01%. See id. at 575-78. 
 
Appellants argue that they are entitled to recover the 
much higher rate of interest that the Plan actually earned 
while their benefits were withheld, approximately 12%, and 
allege several flaws in the District Court's analysis. First, 
they argue that the District Court erred by concluding that 
requiring the Plan to disgorge all profits earned by delaying 
payment of their benefits would be "punitive in nature." See 
Appellants' App. at 26. "As a matter of logic," they argue, 
"when a defendant is stripped of a benefit it had no right to 
retain, it is not being `punished.' " Id. Although we can find 
flaws in Appellants' own analysis, we ultimately conclude 
that whether disgorgement is deemed punitive or otherwise, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining 
to adopt it as a remedy in this case. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that any return the Plan 
realized in excess of the risk-free yield on Treasury Bills 
during the relevant period would be the result of the Plan's 
investment expertise and labor, as well as additional risk 
that the Plan, not Appellants, bore. Had the Plan's 
investments yielded a lower rate of return than Treasury 
Bills, or even a loss, it would have been the Plan rather 
than Appellants that would have been required to bear the 
resulting loss. 
 
Indeed, as Appellants concede, in such circumstances 
they would have sought, and likely would have recovered, 
interest based on the Treasury Bill yield or some other 
"minimal standard rate." Appellant's Br. at 29 n.2. 
Consequently, requiring the Plan to disgorge profits earned 
as a result of risks irreversibly borne and labor otherwise 
uncompensated could be viewed as punitive. Alternatively, 
awarding interest at a rate higher than the statutory rate 
might be viewed as punitive merely because it would be 
higher than necessary to compensate Appellants. See Ford 
v. Uniroyal Pension Plan, 154 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that awarding interest at a rate that would 
overcompensate the plaintiff would be punitive and would 
contravene "ERISA's remedial goal of simply placing the 
plaintiff in the position he or she would have occupied but 
for the defendant's wrongdoing."). 
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In any event, what matters is not how the District Court 
characterized disgorgement, but whether its balancing of 
the equities amounted to an abuse of discretion. Wefind no 
such abuse in the District Court's conclusion that the Plan 
had acted in good faith, and that Appellants would be fully 
compensated by interest paid at the statutory post- 
judgment rate. 
 
Appellants next argue that deeming disgorgement of 
profits as punitive defies the law as well as logic. The 
District Court's approach, they argue, contravenes Fotta's 
"paramount goal" of deterring ERISA violations by denying 
wrongdoers the profits of their misconduct. See Appellant's 
Br. at 26. Again, however, the argument misconstrues our 
decision in Fotta. Deterrence was not the paramount goal in 
Fotta, but only one of the decision's two  primary goals-- 
providing restitution and preventing unjust enrichment "at 
beneficiaries' expense." Fotta, 165 F.3d at 214 (emphasis 
added). Interest earned in excess of what Appellants 
themselves would have earned is not earned at their 
expense. 
 
Appellants next argue that the District Court 
"impermissibly imposed a requirement of " culpability on 
the Defendants' part not found in Fotta. See Appellants' Br. 
at 27. But the mere fact that Fotta did not impose a 
requirement of culpability does not mean that the District 
Court, in its discretionary application of equitable 
principles, could not do so. 
 
In their final argument on this issue, Appellants contend 
that although this court "has not yet ruled on the 
appropriate measure of prejudgment interest under ERISA," 
it "has made clear that selection of an appropriate rate of 
prejudgment interest must be made in light of the goals of 
the statute involved." Id. at 31. They then argue, implicitly 
rather than expressly, that only disgorgement can 
effectuate ERISA's goals. 
 
As an initial matter, the cases cited by Appellants in 
support of this argument did not hold that a statutorily- 
established rate of interest was per se inadequate, as 
Appellants imply. Rather they merely upheld the relevant 
decision maker's discretion to award interest at a higher 
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rate according to equitable principles. See Peterson v. 
Crown Financial Corp., 661 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(holding that where a "claim sounds in restitution, it calls 
for the exercise of the court's broader equitable powers," 
leaving the trial judge with the discretion to award interest 
above the statutory rate); North Cambria Fuel Co., Inc. v. 
NLRB, 645 F.2d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1123 (1981) (holding that the NLRB's "broad discretion 
in fashioning remedies . . . extends to the imposition of an 
interest rate."). 
 
Additionally, ERISA's goals do not mandate total 
disgorgement. As we recently noted, "ERISA does no more 
than protect the benefits which are due to an employee 
under a plan." Bennett v. Conrail Matched Savings Plan, 
168 F.3d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized, the 
purpose of granting equitable relief under ERISA is simply 
to place "the plaintiff in the position he or she would have 
occupied but for the defendant's wrongdoing." Ford, 154 
F.3d at 619. 
 
Awarding Appellants in this case interest at a higher rate 
then they would have earned had they invested their 
benefits on their own behalf would go beyond making them 
whole. Therefore, ERISA's goals can be achieved by 
awarding interest below the rate actually earned by the 
Plan. Thus, Appellants' own argument on this point weighs 
in favor of affirming the District Court's decision to award 
interest at the statutory rate. Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
B. Laches 
 
Though the District Court awarded Appellants interest on 
their delayed pension benefits, it also ruled that the 
doctrine of laches limited the period for which interest 
could be recovered. According to the court, "under 
Pennsylvania law, in the absence of fraud or concealment, 
laches generally follows the statute of limitations." Mem. & 
Order of 02/04/1999 at 5 (J.A. at 528) (citing United 
National Ins. Co. v. J.H. France Refractories Co. , 668 A.2d 
120 (Pa. 1995)). Concluding that there was no fraud or 
concealment in this case, the District Court determined 
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that Pennsylvania's general six-year statute of limitations 
was the most appropriate limitations period, and restricted 
the period for which Appellants could recover interest 
accordingly. See id. at 7. On appeal, Appellants do not 
challenge the District Court's findings regarding the 
absence of fraud or concealment. Rather, they argue that 
the District Court misinterpreted United National Ins. Co., 
and erred in its application of the laches doctrine. We 
agree. 
 
As an equitable doctrine, the decision to apply laches is 
left to the sound discretion of the District Court. See Gruca 
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1258 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Consequently, appellate review of a lower court's 
application of the doctrine is limited to a review for abuse 
of discretion. See id. Nevertheless, in the exercise of its 
discretion, the District Court must correctly apply the 
governing law. In this case, the District Court did not make 
the necessary findings and we must remand. 
 
In United National Ins. Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court did, as the District Court correctly noted, iterate that 
" `[i]n the absence of fraud or concealment, it is that general 
rule that laches follows the statute of limitations.' " 668 
A.2d at 124 (quoting Silver v. Korr, 139 A.2d 552, 555 (Pa. 
1958)), and (citing Philadelphia v. Louis Lab., Inc., 189 A.2d 
891, 893 (1963)). But the court's opinion did not discuss, 
much less define, the doctrine of laches itself. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of laches has two 
elements: (1) inexcusable delay; and (2) prejudice. See, e.g., 
Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Pa. 1998) 
("Laches arises when a defendant's position or rights are so 
prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus 
attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an 
injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim 
against him.") (emphasis in the original); DiLucia v. 
Clemens, 541 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super 1988) ("In order to 
prevail on his assertion of the equitable defense of laches, 
[the defendant] must establish both undue delay from [the 
plaintiff 's] failure to exercise due diligence and prejudice 
resulting from the delay."). See also Burke v. Gateway, 441 
F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1971) (noting that before a district 
court can apply the doctrine of laches, it mustfind 
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"inexcusable delay in light of the equities of the case and 
prejudice to the defendant."). The District Court applied the 
doctrine of laches, but did not determine that its two 
required elements were satisfied. Accordingly, we will 
reverse the District Court on the issue of laches, and 
remand for a proper application of the doctrine. 
 
C. Class Certification 
 
After the District Court denied Appellants' initial motion 
for class certification without prejudice, the parties 
undertook discovery on the issue of whether class 
certification would be proper. Thereafter, Appellants 
renewed their motion, seeking certification of the following 
two classes of plaintiffs: 
 
       Class One [Offset Claims]: 
 
       All persons who retired on or after July 31, 1977 and 
       their beneficiaries who are or were entitled to pension 
       benefits under the Pension Plan of Bethlehem Steel 
       Corporation and Subsidiary Companies but whose 
       benefits were denied or reduced due to their receipt of 
       benefits from another pension plan or fund that were 
       attributable to employment with a former employer 
       that was not an "Employing Company" within the 
       meaning of the Plan. 
 
       Class Two [Interest Claims]: 
 
       All persons, including beneficiaries, who are or were 
       entitled to pension benefits under the Pension Plan of 
       Bethlehem Steel Corporation and Subsidiary 
       Companies whose benefits were delayed, reduced or 
       denied by the Plan for more than 90 days and who 
       have received or will receive a retroactive payment by 
       the Plan of such withheld pension benefits. 
 
Mem. & Order of 06/30/99 at 4 (J.A. at 604) (citing Pls.' 
Renewed Motion at 1). 
 
In a 29-page Memorandum and Order, the District Court 
denied certification of both proposed classes,finding them 
deficient in several respects. On appeal, Appellants argue 
that the District Court's certification analysis contains 
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numerous errors. They also claim that the "principle basis 
for denying class certification was the fact that after the 
renewed class motion was filed, but before the class ruling, 
the court elected to grant final relief to the two named 
Appellants and their claims were no longer actively 
pending." Appellants' Br. at 39-40 (citing Mem. & Order of 
06/30/1999 at 8-10 (J.A. at 608-10)). That claim grossly 
mischaracterizes the District Court's decision. 
 
1. Requirements for Class Actions 
 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a civil suit 
may proceed as a class action only if it satisfies four 
prerequisites. Accordingly, 
 
       [o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued 
       as representative parties on behalf of all only if: 
 
       (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
       members is impracticable; 
 
       (2) there are questions of law or fact common to t he 
       class; 
 
       (3) the claims or defenses of the representative p arties 
       are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
 
       (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade quately 
       protect the interests of the class. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 
 
In addition to the requirements expressly enumerated in 
Rule 23, class actions are also subject to more generally 
applicable rules such as those governing standing and 
mootness. For instance, a plaintiff who lacks the 
personalized, redressable injury required for standing to 
assert claims on his own behalf would also lack standing to 
assert similar claims on behalf of a class. See Davis v. 
Thornburgh, 903 F.2d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 1990). Additionally, 
even a plaintiff with standing is generally disqualified from 
representing a class if his individual claim becomes moot 
before the proposed class is certified. See Rosetti v. Shalala, 
12 F.3d 1216, 1225 (3d Cir. 1993); Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 
975 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Not 
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surprisingly, however, there are exceptions to this general 
rule. One such exception is at issue in this case. 
 
So long as a class representative has a live claim at the 
time he moves for class certification, neither a pending 
motion nor a certified class action need be dismissed if his 
individual claim subsequently becomes moot. See id. at 
1228. If, on the other hand, the putative class 
representative's individual claim becomes moot before he 
moves for class certification, then any subsequent motion 
must be denied and the entire action dismissed. See 
Lusardi, 975 F.2d at 978. 
 
2. Standard of Review 
 
We review a decision to certify, or to deny certification of, 
a class action for abuse of discretion. See In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. Am. Sales Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Products Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 782 (3d Cir. 1995)); 
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d 
Cir. 1992). We may find an abuse of discretion"where the 
`district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.' " Id. (quoting In re General Motors 
Corp., 55 F.3d. at 783) (additional quotation marks and 
citations omitted). 
 
3. Class One (Offset Claims) 
 
The District Court identified multiple, alternative grounds 
for denying certification of the Class One "offset" claims. 
First, it concluded that the proposed class had been defined 
too broadly to permit certification. Stated differently, the 
District Court concluded that Appellants sought to assert 
claims on behalf of the proposed class that they had not, 
and could not, assert on their own behalf. Consequently, 
they were not qualified to represent the proposed class. 
Second, the court concluded that even if the proposed class 
were properly defined, it failed to satisfy three of Rule 
23(a)'s four prerequisites for certification. Appellants raise 
separate challenges to each of these conclusions. 
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The District Court based its conclusion that proposed 
Class One was overbroad on several factors. First, the court 
noted that after it had dismissed Plaintiff Holmes' 
"continuing-offset claim" without prejudice, he had 
 
reasserted that claim in a separate lawsuit. Consequently, 
there was no live continuing-offset claim pending before the 
court for which a class could be certified. See Mem. & 
Order of 06/30/99 at 8 (J.A. 608). The court then noted 
that both Appellants had settled their "mistaken-offset 
claims" through administrative means before filing their 
complaint seeking interest on those claims. Consequently, 
they lacked live claims at the time they filed their motion 
for class certification, requiring that it be denied. See id. at 
8-10. 
 
On appeal, Appellants argue that under the law of this 
Circuit, the fact that their mistaken-offset claims had 
become moot did not disqualify them from representing the 
proposed class, and thus did not mandate denial of 
certification. Again, they miscomprehend the relevant law. 
The status of their own claims would be irrelevant only if 
those claims were live at the time they moved for class 
certification. Their claims, however, were moot before they 
even filed their complaint. Consequently, they are 
disqualified from representing the proposed class and the 
District Court did not err by denying certification. See 
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 978 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
In addition to concluding that Appellants lacked the live 
claims required for class certification, the District Court 
also concluded that certification of proposed Class One 
should be denied on several alternative grounds. For 
instance, the court concluded that the proposed class was 
"so highly diverse and so difficult to identify that [it] is not 
adequately defined or ascertainable." Mem. & Order of 
06/30/1999 at 12 (J.A. 612) (listing six areas that would 
require detailed inquiry). In addition, the court concluded 
that even if the proposed class had been properly defined, 
it did not satisfy Rule 23(a)'s commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy-of-representation requirements. See id.  at 17-19, 
23, 25; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)-(4). 
 
On appeal, Appellants raise separate challenges to each 
of these alternative bases for denying certification. Here we 
 
                                18 
  
need not decide whether the District Court erred, because 
the fact that Appellants lacked live claims at the time they 
moved for certification bars certification of proposed Class 
One in any event. Consequently, there is no need to 
consider the validity of Appellants' additional challenges, 
and denial of certification of Class One will be affirmed. 
 
4. Class Two (Interest Claims) 
 
As it did with respect to proposed Class One, the District 
Court identified several alternative grounds for denying 
certification of proposed Class Two. First, the District Court 
concluded that Class Two was defined too broadly"because 
it includes every plan participant, past or future, who has 
received or will be receiving a delayed payment of benefits." 
Mem. & Order of 06/30/1999 at 13 (J.A. 613) (citation 
omitted). The court had "particular misgivings with respect 
to the `future' members of the class because of the 
infeasibility of auditing the Plan in order to determine 
whether each participant may or may not have some 
present or future claim regarding delayed benefits." Id. 
(citation omitted). The court further concluded that the 
proposed class was "ill-defined" because it included 
individuals who had received or may one day receive 
delayed benefits for any reason. In contrast, Appellants' 
claims focused on "incorrect offsets since the Plan's 
amendment in 1977." Id. at 13-14. 
 
Appellants argue that the District Court incorrectly 
concluded that proposed Class Two was overbroad. See 
Appellants' Br. at 43-45. They do not, however, expressly 
claim that the conclusion was "clearly erroneous" as 
required for reversal on appeal. Nor, in fact, are the District 
Court's conclusions clearly erroneous. 
 
Appellants first argue that "[a]lthough the court believed 
that determining interest for the members of Class Two 
would require individualized determinations, this is not 
correct." Id. at 44 (internal citation omitted). Yet Appellants 
fail to explain why such a belief is incorrect. Based on their 
subsequent arguments, Appellants appear to believe that 
the interest entitlement of every class member can be 
calculated using a single, objective formula, and that the 
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parties, not the court, would be responsible for performing 
the requisite calculations. See id. Such a belief ignores 
Fotta's clear holding that interest on delayed ERISA benefits 
is an equitable remedy dependent upon the individual facts 
of each claim. Thus, there is no single, objective formula for 
calculating each class member's interest entitlement. 
Moreover, it is the province of the court, not the parties, to 
balance the equities in each claim. Therefore, the District 
Court's conclusion that individualized determinations 
would be required is not clearly erroneous. 
 
Appellants next argue that even if individualized 
determinations are required, that fact alone is not a "legally 
valid ground to deny class certification." Id. at 44. But the 
cases on which Appellants rely do not support their 
argument. For instance, in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., we 
held that: 
 
       it has been commonly recognized that the necessity for 
       calculation of damages on an individual basis should 
       not preclude class determination when the common 
       issues which determine liability predominate.  E.g., 
       Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass, 
       Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 196 8); Dolgow v. 
       Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1968 ). If 
       for any reason the district court were to conclude that 
       there would be problems involved in proving damages 
       which would outweigh the advantages of class 
       certification, it should give appropriate consideration to 
       certification of a class limited to the determination of 
       liability. See Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 
 
561 F.2d 434, 456 (3d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). As 
already noted, the issue of liability itself requires an 
individualized inquiry into the equities of each claim. Thus, 
the District Court did not err by concluding that proposed 
Class Two was overly broad and we will affirm denial of 
certification. 
 
D. Work-Product Immunity 
 
Before seeking relief in the District Court, Appellant 
Holmes pursued his interest claim through administrative 
channels. His original claim to interest prompted a Plan 
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attorney to prepare a legal memorandum analyzing the 
merits of the claim. Once judicial action had been initiated, 
Appellants moved to compel production of that 
memorandum during discovery. A Magistrate Judge denied 
the motion, concluding that the memorandum was 
protected from discovery by the doctrine of work-product 
immunity. See Mem. of 01/08/1999 at 5-6 (J.A. at 514-15). 
Appellants then appealed to the District Court, which 
affirmed. In the final issue raised in their appeal, 
Appellants argue that the Magistrate Judge erred by 
denying their production request, and that the District 
Court erred by affirming the Magistrate Judge's order. 
 
We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion. See 
Massachusetts School of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American 
Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d 
Cir. 1987); Marroquin-Manriquez v. INS, 699 F.2d 129, 134 
(3d Cir. 1983)). We agree that the Magistrate Judge erred, 
and that the District Court thus erred by affirming denial 
of Appellants' motion to compel discovery. 
 
The doctrine of work-product immunity " `shelters the 
mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged 
area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's 
case.' " In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 981 
(3d Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Nobles , 422 U.S. 
225, 238 (1975)). A party claiming work-product immunity 
bears the burden of showing that the materials in question 
"were prepared in `the course of preparation for possible 
litigation.' " Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 94 
(quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947); 
Conoco, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 
730 (3d Cir. 1982). Work product prepared in the ordinary 
course of business is not immune from discovery. If the 
party asserting the privilege bears its burden of proof, the 
party seeking production may obtain discovery "only upon 
a showing that the party. . . has substantial need of the 
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the 
party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." 
Fed. R. Civ. 26(b)(3). 
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In concluding that the memorandum at issue in this case 
was protected by work-product immunity, the Magistrate 
Judge noted that the Plan's attorney had prepared it 
shortly after Plaintiff Holmes' attorney placed a telephone 
call to a subordinate of the Plan's administrator. In that 
telephone conversation, Holmes' attorney claimed that 
Holmes was entitled to interest on his delayed benefits and 
further asserted that failure to pay interest violated ERISA. 
See Mem. of 01/08/1999 at 2 (J.A. 511). Thereafter, the 
Plan's attorney prepared a memorandum analyzing the 
merits of Holmes' interest claim. 
 
Based on this factual background, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that "it is apparent the [memorandum] was 
prepared in anticipation of possible future litigation. In 
addition, it is reasonable to conclude that the document 
would not have been prepared but for the prospect of 
litigation." Id. at 6. The District Court determined that the 
Magistrate Judge's reasoning was "not clearly erroneous or 
contrary to law," and entered an order affirming denial of 
Appellants' request for production. See Dist. Ct. Order of 
02/03/1999 at 1-2 n.1 (J.A. 522-23). 
 
The Magistrate Judge's conclusions may be reasonable, 
but they are based on nothing more than assumptions. 
There is nothing in the record indicating that the 
Defendants have carried their burden of showing that the 
memorandum was, in fact, prepared in anticipation of 
possible litigation. Indeed, the Defendants appear to have 
claimed nothing more than that "the memorandum was 
written in connection with the claim by Plaintiff Holmes . . . 
and . . . is, therefore, privileged and immune from discovery 
under . . . the work product doctrine." Def.s' Answers to 
Pl.s' Second Set of Interrogs. at 14 (J.A. 517). The mere fact 
that the memorandum was prepared "in connection with" 
Plaintiff Holmes' administrative claim to interest on his 
delayed benefits hardly establishes that it was prepared in 
anticipation of litigation. The Magistrate Judge abused his 
discretion in assuming otherwise. Therefore, we will reverse 
the order denying Appellants' request for production. 
 
E. The Cross Appeal 
 
Raising a single issue in their cross appeal, the Cross- 
Appellants (defendants below) suggest that our decision in 
Fotta is: 
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       unclear to the extent it does not address situations in 
       which a participant brings a claim for interest, but the 
       plan at issue expressly disallows such payment, or the 
       plan administrator, who has discretionary authority, 
       has construed the plan to mean that such payment is 
       not allowed. 
 
Cross-Appellants' Br. at 37. They therefore invite us to 
modify Fotta "to hold that under appropriate 
circumstances, plan provisions will be given effect and 
deference paid to plan administrators' decisions to deny 
interest on delayed benefits and overpayments." Id. at 37- 
38. 
 
We decline the invitation for three reasons. First, the 
Cross-Appellees did not raise this issue below, and have 
thus waived it on appeal. See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 
1993). Second, the Bethlehem Steel Plan at issue does not 
contain a provision preventing the payment of interest on 
delayed benefits. Consequently, the Cross-Appellees' 
arguments on this point are entirely hypothetical, lacking 
the concrete, particularized facts necessary to support a 
sound judicial decision. Third, only an en banc  court can 
overturn Fotta's holding that interest on delayed payment of 
plan benefits is an implied term of the plan contract. See 
Fotta, 165 F.3d at 213-14; see also United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, Internal Operating Procedure 
9.1 (Policy of Avoiding Intra-circuit Conflict of Precedent). 
Therefore, we decline to entertain the arguments presented 
in the cross appeal. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The District Court correctly concluded that interest 
awards on delayed employment benefits are an equitable 
remedy left to its discretion. The court did not abuse that 
discretion by awarding Appellants interest at the post- 
judgment statutory rate, and we affirm the award. Nor did 
the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to certify 
the two classes of plaintiffs proposed in Appellants' 
complaint and subsequent motion for certification. 
Accordingly, we also affirm the District Court's denial of 
class certification. 
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The District Court did err in two respects, however. First, 
the court erred by applying the doctrine of laches without 
first determining that its two required elements were 
satisfied. Consequently, we reverse on this issue and 
remand the case for further findings of fact. Additionally, 
the court erred by concluding that the legal memorandum 
Appellants sought to discover was entitled to work-product 
immunity. The memorandum may well be entitled to 
immunity, but, on this record, the Defendants have not 
carried their burden of showing that it is. Therefore, we 
reverse the District Court's ruling on work-product 
immunity and remand for further findings. 
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